The Divine Wanderer: Travel and Divinization in Late Antiquity

Ian W. Scott
King's University College
iscott2@uwo.ca

(work in progress – please do not distribute or cite)

Introduction: The Wandering Divine Man

> *It is early morning. Gazing through the dust and growing heat we see a lone figure rise over the crest of the nearby hill and move along the road toward the town. His step is steady and determined, as if he has been walking a long way and will walk further yet. As the figure draws closer to the town gate we can see that he wears a cloak woven of exotic reds and blues. The staff upon which he leans is carved with strange signs, and several amulets sway from his neck. He approaches in silence until he stands under the arch of the gate. There he stops, raises his eyes to take in the small crowd lining the main street, and calls out in a voice like a trumpet: "Today salvation has come to this town! I am the hand of God!"*

This is the kind of wandering shaman which often comes to mind when we think of divinized human beings in late Antiquity. It was Richard Reitzenstein who in 1910 first established this image of "wandering servants of individual Oriental deities" who used "prediction and miracle" to gain a hearing (1978:25). Such divine missionaries, Reitzenstein suggested, offered initiation into new mysteries, mysteries which promised a sexual union with the deity by which the participant would receive that god's "inner-most essence and power" (1978:27, 34). Ludwig Bieler placed much less emphasis on the itinerant proselytizing of such "divine men" when he published his magisterial work on the *ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ*. Yet this image of the divine missionary remained an influential one. After all, Reitzenstein brought the divine man on stage primarily in order to explain the rapid spread of "Oriental" mystery cults (1978:25).

In recent decades this whole model of a "divine man" type has, of course, come under heavy criticism. Yet the association between itinerant missionary work and divinization has persisted. Among scholars of Christian origins this persistence is, in part, a result of the ongoing influence of older works which employed the classical model of Reitzenstein and Bieler, works such as Dieter Georgi's study of the "false prophets" in 2 Corinthians (1986; cf. Kolenkow 1994) and T. J. Weeden's investigation of the background to Mark's Gospel (1968; cf. Nickle 2001:80-81). In the wider field of classical studies, the association between travel and divinization has been reinforced, ironically, by recent attempts to move beyond the θεῖος ἄνηρ paradigm and develop a more generic category of "holy men" (e.g., Anderson 1994). Yet in this attempt to improve on the θεῖος ἄνηρ model, recent scholars have repeated some of the key mistakes of the past. Peter Brown has complained (1982:131) of the way in which fourth century CE Christian ascetics are treated together with earlier Greco-Roman philosophers, despite the vast difference in behaviour and social function which separate these two types. Anderson, for example, treats the Jewish prophet Jeshua son of Ananias

(Josephus, *BJ* 6.300-9) as a typical "Imperial holy man" together with the anonymous figure in Dio Cassius (79[80].18.1ff.) who claims the identity of Alexander of Macedon and leads a Bacchic procession through Moesia and Thrace (Anderson 1994:1-2). Not only does this combination obscure the difference in religious understanding between a Jewish prophet and a Bacchic re-appearance of Alexander, but the juxtaposition also obscures the difference which travel plays in the activity of these two figures. The one is essentially static, active only at the centre of Jewish life in Jerusalem's temple. The other is pictured as constantly moving until he mysteriously disappears; travel is an essential aspect of his *modus operandi*. On the other hand, Anderson invokes the missionary travels of St. Paul, Jesus, and Mani (already diverse figures) alongside the sacred pilgrimage of Apollonius of Tyana, giving the impression that they both reflect the activity of a single type of "holy man" (1994:167-74). The difference is thus obscured between those regarded as having become divine and those who merely serve the divine, even while the travels of one category are confused with the activities of the other.

In this paper I will try to bring some clarity to these issues by examining the ways in which travel functions in the lives of four divinized human beings as they are depicted in sources from the second- to the early fourth- centuries CE. The first section will focus on the Philostratus' massive biography of Apollonius of Tyana, the figure which has served as the prototypic divinized human from Reitzenstein to the present. In section two I will examine the role of travel in the two lives of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus. Finally, section three will briefly survey Lucian's portraits of Alexander of Abonuteichos and Peregrinus Proteus. Although we will not have sufficient space here to consider the various senses in which these figures might be considered "divine," all are accorded by their devotees some divine status in their own right which rises above the ontological level of ordinary humanity. In my survey of these sources, I will focus on three aspects of each figure's travels: 1) the pattern of actual geographical movement; 2) the reasons which motivate the figure (at least as depicted) to make these moves; and 3) the messages which these travels help to convey about the figure in question.

I. Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana

In Philostratus' biography of Apollonius we can distinguish seven stages of the sage's activity, based on shifting patterns of travel.[1] 1) The first stage involves his traveling as a child in order to gain a teacher suitable for his precocious intellect. 2) The second begins when Apollonius reaches adulthood and begins an itinerant life in the

[1] There is no doubt that Apollonius was the object of a cult after his death. Eunapius calls him οὐκέτι φιλόσοφος· ἀλλ' ἦν τι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέσον (*Vit. Phil.* 454). Within Philostratus' biography we are told that Damis "worshipped him" (προσηύξατο αὐτόν) and "regarded him as a demon" (ὥσπερ δαίμονα ἔβλεπε) at their first meeting (1.19). The head of the border garrison at Babylonia head addresses him as "divine Apollonius" (θεῖε Ἀπολλώνιε). In Rome, Tigellinus refuses to prosecute Apollonius for fear that this would require him "to fight with a god (θεομαχεῖν)" (4.44). In Alexandria he is welcomed into the city "as if he was a god (θεῷ ἴσα) " (5.24). In his later trial, indeed, one of the chief charges is that he accepts worship and thus sets himself "on a level with the gods" (ὡς ἴσων ἀξιούμενον τοῖς θεοῖς) (7.21). In prison, while awaiting his trial before Domitian, Apollonius steps out of his fetters without prayer or sacrifice. Damis responds by affirming that the sage is "divine and superhuman" (θεία τε . . . καὶ κρείττων ἀνθρώπου) (7.38). See also 8.7, 8, 15. Elsner (1997:28) observes the reference in 8.31 to a shrine (ἱερόν) to Apollonius which is probably to be identified with the temple at his birth-site mentioned in 1.5.

regions surrounding Tyana. It is during this stage that the sage begins the pattern of public preaching for which he is known. 3) Still a young man, Apollonius breaks off this itinerant teaching in order to travel east, to study the wisdom of the Brahmins in India. 4) On returning from his journey east, the sage resumes his life of itinerant teaching in Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy. This stage culminates with his journey to Rome and confrontation with the anti-philosophical policies of Nero. 5) After the crisis in Rome is resolved, Apollonius leaves the Greco-Roman heartland again for another phase of travel to distant lands. This time he moves west and south, visiting Spain, the islands west of Italy, and finally Egypt and Ethiopia. After this tour of the south Philostratus tells us that the sage travelled less frequently and only to lands which he had already visited (6.35). No other journeys are narrated outside Greece, Ionia and Italy. 6) Returning from Egypt to Ionia and Greece, Apollonius begins agitating against the harsh policies of Emperor Domitian. Instead of waiting to be arrested, the sage travels again to Rome and confronts the imperial power for a second time, this time facing the Emperor himself. 7) At the culmination of his trial in Rome, Apollonius is miraculously translated from the imperial court to Dicaearchia and resumes his itinerant life of teaching in Asia Minor and Greece until his mysterious death.

Traveling in Search of Wisdom

Since Philostratus associates the divinity of Apollonius very closely with his wisdom, it is important to note how the sage's travels play a key role in supporting the claim that Apollonius possesses a unique insight into the cosmos. The sage's unusual capacity for this wisdom is emphasized in the beginning of the text when the philosopher is forced to travel in order to find a teacher suited to his precocious abilities. As a child he is brought to Tarsus to train with Euthydemus “the teacher from Phoenicia” (*VA* 1.7), but Apollonius finds the city "harsh and strange and little conducive to the philosophic life,” steeped as it is in luxury and insolence (1.7).[2] So the sage moves from Tarsus to Aegae, where he finds “a peace congenial to one who would be a philosopher” (1.7). Here again, though, his teacher turns out to be superficial, an Epicurean who was “a slave of his belly and appetites” (1.7). Instead of leaving Aegae, however, the young Apollonius takes up residence in the local temple to Asclepius (1.8). He has been “fledged and winged” in philosophy by “some higher power (τινος κρείττονος)” (1.7) and it seems he must continue his philosophical training under the tutelage of the god. Hence, while the young sage’s moves to Tarsus and Aegae were indicative of his remarkable philosophical aptitude, his period of stability at Aegae reflects the fact that at a tender age he had already outgrown the teachers of the surrounding regions.

It is the eastern journey of Apollonius, however, which serves more than anything else to explain and ground the claim that the sage was uniquely wise. The journey east is, as Elsner has observed, an allegory of the philosopher's journey to the heights of esoteric wisdom. Apollonius moves through standard sites of "rhetorical geography" which are associated with wisdom: Nineveh, Mesopotamia and Babylon (1.21-2.1), and India (2:17-3:50; Elsner 1997:23; Anderson 1986:129). The remoteness and foreignness of these regions is highlighted by the author’s long excurses on exotic flora, fauna, and culture, accounts which bring to mind the well-known "traveler's tales" which offered the reader

[2] All citations of the *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* are from Conybeare 1912.

of antiquity glimpses from "the boundaries of the known" (Elsner 1997:25; Anderson 1986:200).[3] As Apollonius moves east he is traveling further and further outside the realm of ordinary experience. At the same time, the people whom the sage encounters grow increasingly wise the closer he approaches to the eastern boundary of the world. In Nineveh Apollonius learns nothing and encounters priests and prophets who do not understand their own cults (1.19). In Babylon, he begins to find genuine wisdom. He spends time with the Magi, and Philostratus tells us that the sage “learned some things from them, and taught them others” (1.26). They are “wise men, but not in all respects” (1.26). While this may not sound flattering, we must remember that in the more familiar world Apollonius found no teacher capable of imparting wisdom, no society which lived wisely. Here in Babylon, for the first time, Apollonius finds sages from whom he can learn, even if their wisdom is imperfect. Although the Babylonian king may indulge in questionable practices such as animal sacrifice (1.31) and hunting (1.37), the ruler is unusually responsive to the sage’s teaching, so that at his departure Apollonius calls him “a worthy man and too superior a person to be ruling over barbarians” (1.39).

With Apollonius’ departure from Babylon it becomes still more clear that the sage’s progress represents a movement into rare, esoteric wisdom. Already in Babylon Apollonius refuses to include his disciple Damis in his conversations with the Magi (1.26). This eastern wisdom may only be heard by those who are specially prepared to receive it. As they cross the Caucasus on way to the Indus valley, Apollonius draws an explicit comparison between their high, dangerous mountain path and the difficult life which leads to divine wisdom (2.5). At the same time, Philostratus’ text grows thick here with reports of the exotic wonders beyond Babylon. This movement beyond the familiarity of Greece and Rome, to the absolute edge of the known, is at the same time a movement into a kind of wisdom unavailable to ordinary human beings.

In India, Apollonius is welcomed by a king whom the sage recognizes to be a “philosopher” (2.25-26), who lives a simple and peaceful life, eats no animals (2.26), and enjoys self knowledge (2.27). Though he says he regards Apollonius as his superior (2.27), the sage gives him no instruction or correction on his manner of living, advising him only on the judgment of one difficult case (2.39). Moreover, the parallel between the banquet held by the Indian king (2.28-37), filled with philosophical discussion, and Plato’s *Symposium* is difficult to miss. It is beyond the Indian city, however, in the remote stronghold of the Brahmins that Apollonius finds "men who are unfeignedly wise" (ἄνδρας σοφοὺς ἀτεχνῶς) (3.12; cf. 3.16). These Brahmins practice levitation (3.15, 17), prescience (3.16), and the self knowledge which was the elusive goal of Greek philosophy (τὸ ἑαυτὸν γνῶναι) (3.18). Where Apollonius stubbornly resisted the protocols and entry requirements of Babylon, here for the first time the sage submits passively that the Brahmins’ instructions. Moreover, the Brahmin leader Iarchus is the first to correct Apollonius’ own views (3.25). The sage becomes a pupil.

---

[3] The *VA* is filled with descriptions of animals (2.2, 6, 11-12, 14-15; 3.1, 2, 6-8, 48, 49, 50; 6.24), strange lands (3.53, 54, 55, 56), foreign rivers (2.18; 3.53; 6.1; 3.1, 52; 3.5; 6.23, 26), strange objects and artworks (2.13; 3.46; 5.5; 1.25; 2.8-9, 20-22; 3.14; 5.4, 21), odd or marvelous peoples and customs (1.24, 31; 2.4, 20; 3.47, 57; 6.25), and natural wonders (*VA* 3.3, 4, 14, 15; 5.3, 16-17). Though Philostratus endorses some episodes, even supporting them with claims of autopsy (3:53; 5:2; 6:16), Elsner points out that the biographer also confesses his own skepticism in the case of others (Elsner 1997:29; see 3.45).

The impregnable military strength of the Brahmins' castle, along with its remote location, seems to represent the extreme difficulty involved in attaining this higher wisdom. Only Apollonius and Damis are permitted entry into the castle, his guide and other companions remaining outside (3.12), and while Damis is allowed to hear the "abstract discussions" with the Brahmins, only Apollonius himself is permitted in the discussions of "occult themes" such as astronomy, divination, and sacrifice (3.41). For those who gain access to this complete wisdom, however, it brings about a profound transformation. It is here with the Brahmins that Apollonius first remembers his previous lives (3.23) and performs healing miracles (3.38-39). Having been changed by this wisdom, his hosts predict that Apollonius will "be esteemed a god by many (θεὸν τοῖς πολλοῖς εἶναι δόξειν), not merely after his death but when he was still alive" (3.50) (Elsner 1997:31). Hence, in his farewell to the Indian sages, Apollonius credits them with giving him the opportunity "even to travel through the heavens" (3.51), i.e., opening to him the insight which has brought about a metaphysical transition to divinity (Elsner 1997:30).

On one level this journey east explains in practical terms how Apollonius comes to possess a wisdom above all others in the Greco-Roman world. He has been taught from a tradition normally inaccessible to other Greeks and Romans. At the same time, this same journey is symbolic of the ascent to wisdom itself, an ascent which takes Apollonius beyond the bounds of ordinary human nature and brings about his transformation into something divine.

Demonstrating Wisdom: Itinerancy and Cultic Reform

Even as the young Apollonius searches for wisdom, however, his travels provide the opportunity for Philostratus to demonstrate how wise he is already. Each new location furnishes the author with a fresh cast of fools in comparison to whom the sage's wisdom becomes all the more obvious. For the first five years of Apollonius' initial travels around Pamphylia and Cilicia the sage maintains a discipline of strict silence (1.14). Hence, we are told, he does not immediately give correct the "effeminate" populace with open speech (1.15). Even without speech, however, Apollonius is able to quell discord in several cities, teaching people to live in justice (1.15). At a gesture or look, Philostratus tells us, people would hush their voices "as if they were engaged in the mysteries" (1.15). Already at this early stage the sage is clearly focussed on the purity and integrity of local cults. In Syrian Antioch he laments that the Temple of Apollo of Daphne is "the home of no serious studies, but only of men half-barbarous and uncultivated (ἡμιβαρβάρους καὶ ἀμούσους)" (1.16). From then on he avoids the Syrian cities, looking for more "solemn places" (1.16) where he can practice his philosophical life. At time passes, however, he begins a deliberate program of cult reform. In Greek cities Apollonius gathers the priests together and "corrects" them, "supposing they had departed from the traditional forms" (1.16). In the "barbarian" centres, we are told that the sage would study the local rites and "make suggestions, in case he could think of any improvement upon them" (1.16). Even during the early stages of Apollonius' travels in the East, Philostratus continues to highlight the sage's superior understanding of how the gods ought to be worshipped. In Nineveh we are told that he formed "wiser conclusions" about a cult image "than could the priests and prophets" who maintained it (1.19). In Babylonia Apollonius helps the

Eritreans, restoring their ruined tombs and making the appropriate offerings to those they contain, "all that religion demands, except that he did not slay or sacrifice any victim" (1.24). In Babylon itself, Apollonius refuses to take part in the traditional horse sacrifice, instead offering only Frankincense to the sun (1.31). All of this serves to depict the sage as an expert in cultic matters, surrounded by foolish or incompetent priests and worshippers.

It is with his return to the Greco-Roman world, however, that the reformation of local cults becomes Apollonius' primary focus and a driving force behind the travels through Ionia, Greece, Crete, and Italy which occupy book four of the work. In describing the sources for his biography Philostratus says he visited many temples where the sage had restored "long-neglected and decayed rites" (1.2). Here he shows us glimpses of that activity in Pergamum (4.11), on the island of Methymna (4.13), at Athens (4.19, 21), at Sparta (4.31), and at Olympia (4.28). Only in the last case are we told that he commends the priests (in this case the Eleans) on their performance of the rites (4.29). The sage is also said to have made a special tour of the Greek oracular shrines, and in each case "corrected the rites" (4.24). Hence Philostratus emphasizes the irony of the situation when the Athenian steward of the Epidaurian mystery refuses the sage initiation (4.17), even though Apollonius understands the rite better than the priest himself (4.18). Even during his first visit to Rome, the sage's focus falls largely on cultic practice. He advises Telesinius on the proper modes of prayer and sacrifice, and defines his wisdom as "an inspiration (θειασμός) . . . which teaches men how to pray and sacrifice to the gods" (4.40). In those locales where we are not told explicitly that Apollonius corrects the cult, we are usually told at least that he visits the local shrines (4.11, 14, 23, 34, 40; 6.4). In fact, throughout his travels Apollonius continues his early practice, begun at Aegae, of spending his nights within the precincts of a local temple (see, e.g., 1.16; 4.31, 40; 5.20). As Elsner has observed (1997:25-26), these travels are not unlike the kind of pilgrimage to holy sites which is familiar to us from Pausanias, Lucian (*De Dea Syria*), and Aelius Aristides (*Or*. 36) and which was modeled by Roman Emperors such as Hadrian (*Hist. Aug. V.Hadr.* 13-14.7) and Septimius Severus (*Hist. Aug. V.Sev.* 3.4-7; 17.4).[4] Yet the usual trope of pilgrimage is transformed by Philostratus so that Apollonius comes to these shrines as master, not as suppliant (so Elsner 1997:26-27).

Little is said about cultic reform in the hurried account of Apollonius' trip to the extreme West. His journey to Egypt, however, is dominated once again by the sage's activities as a cultic expert. Here, instead of a passive or receptive audience, Apollonius meets the consistent resistance of a people who are used to being regarded as experts themselves. Yet this resistance serves only to emphasize that Apollonius really is wiser in these matters than even the wisest in the Mediterranean world. In Alexandria the sage criticizes animal sacrifices and instructs a priest about the fire-cult (5.25). When the priest protests, Apollonius' response reduces him to silence and demonstrates that the supposed expert is actually "ignorant of religion" (5.26). The sage even presumes to correct the rites of the "naked sages," those who are supposed to be wisest in Egypt (6.5, 11, 14), singling out their worship of animal deities for special criticism (6.18-19, 22). What is the

[4] Elsner observes that this pilgrimage is also often mixed with the "antiquarian" interest visible in observations about comparative ritual and with a kind of "tourism" evident in stories about, e.g., searching for the sources of the Nile (see Ael. Arist. 36; Philostr. *VA* 6.22-26) (Elsner 1997:26).

basis for this claim to teach the wise and pious Egyptians? As Elsner has observed, it is primarily the sage's earlier journey to the East (1997:31). When Apollonius reaches Alexandria we find that Philostratus suddenly begins to make conspicuous references to the sage's possession of Indian wisdom (e.g., 5.30).[5] Then when the outraged Alexandrian priest asks "who is so clever that he can make corrections to the rites of the Egyptians?" Apollonius replies, "anyone with a little wisdom (πᾶς σοφός), if only he come from India" (5.25). In this way Philostratus deliberately connects the sage's early journeys east with these later travels nearer to home. The transformation Apollonius underwent at the limits of human geography/wisdom was so profound that his insight and piety now outstrip that of even the wisest inhabitants of the ordinary world (Elsner 1997:29-30).[6]

Demonstrating Wisdom: Itinerancy and Philosophical Teaching

Cultic reform is not the only activity which Apollonius pursues as he wanders through the Mediterranean world. Wherever he stays he demonstrates his superior wisdom by teaching about philosophical topics.[7] Already in Babylon the sage advises the king concerning several problems having to do with "conduct," with "practice and duty" (1.32; see 1.36, 37), and as a good Pythagorean he advises the ruler against hunting (1.37). When he returns to Ionia and Greece, this kind of teaching becomes a mainstay of his activities. He gives public speeches in Ephesus and Smyrna on matters of morality and government (4.2-3, 5-9). In Athens he attacks the popular gladiatorial shows (4.22), while in Corinth he silences the improper speech of the parricide Bassus (4.26). When he sees some Spartan youths living luxuriously in Olympia, Apollonius rebukes them and spurs Lacedaemon to a renewal of its old austerity (4.27; cf. 4.33). His other speeches and conversations at Olympia revolve around "the most profitable topics, such as wisdom and courage and temperance, and in a word upon all the virtues" (4.31; cf. 4.30). As Apollonius departs for Egypt the author summarizes his activities in Greece by saying that the sage offered "many rebukes indeed," but gave "much good counsel to the cities" (5.20). In Alexandria he condemns fighting over horse races (5.26). Not all of these speeches are directed toward public crowds. In Sparta the sage takes pity on a youth facing trial for abdication of his civic duties and convinces him in a private conversation to abandon his frivolous seafaring (4.32). Other such private conversations cover the morality of selling idols (5.20), the nature of a flute-player's art (5.21), the priority of education over money (5.22), and gluttony (5.23). In both public speeches and private conversations Apollonius demonstrates in each city his mastery of all kinds of philosophical wisdom. A visit to Catana, near Mt. Etna, even furnishes the sage with an

---

[5] One of the few other references during the sage's Mediterranean travels comes at 4.16 where Apollonius is said to survive his interview with Achilles' ghost in Ilium by using prayer learned from the Indians.

[6] The two trips even seem to be deliberately set in parallel by means of Philostratus' observations about similar geography (2.18-19; 6.1) or ethnography (2.18; 3.20; 6.11; 8.7.4) in the two regions (Elsner 1997:30). Elsner also suggests that Apollonius is employing an established rhetorical gambit (1997:24; see Lucian, *Philopseudes*, 33-38; Dio Chr., *Or.* 36 [esp 36.39-61]; Ael. Arist., *Or.* 26.15-57).

[7] Notice that Philostratus deliberately distances Apollonius from the role of sophist in favour of the type of the philosopher. In Alexandria, for example, the sage's "public utterances" are distinguished from speeches delivered "too much in the style of a rhetor" (ῥητορικωτέραν) (5.27).

opportunity to demonstrate his understanding of wondrous phenomena such as volcanoes (5.14-17).

As with Apollonius' cultic knowledge, this philosophical wisdom is also the product of his journey to India. Once again we find that the sage's journey to visit the naked sages of Egypt becomes a contest between their wisdom and the Indian wisdom of Apollonius. Philostratus tells us in 5.37 that the sage is anxious to compare the wisdom of Egyptian gymnosophists with that of India (5.37), and this juxtaposition is further emphasized on the way to the naked sages by means of a travelogue passage which compares the land of Egypt and Ethiopia with the land of India (6.1). When Apollonius arrives, it becomes clear that while these naked sages may understand justice in the abstract (6.21-22), they cannot judge a murder case properly (6.5) and cannot recognize a noble way of life (6.20, 22). They do not even know their own history, for they are themselves descended from the Brahmins (6.11). They buy into the lies spread about Apollonius by his enemies and cannot see the truth about his wisdom (6.7-10; cf. 6.13-14). The conversion of the youngest naked sage to Apollonius' side simply underlines the reality that his former masters are no match for the Indian wisdom of the man from Tyana (6.12, 15-16). This is all the more striking, however, given that Egypt is known for its wisdom, and the naked sages are known as the wisest of the Egyptians. In journeying to meet them Apollonius comes in contact with his only true rivals within the Mediterranean sphere and defeats them in this discursive contest. With this, the last of Apollonius' foreign tours, he is shown to be the wisest man in the ordinary Mediterranean world.

Demonstrating Wisdom: Itinerancy and Wonder Working

Although Apollonius is often remembered, in the modern context, primarily as a miracle-worker, it is interesting to note that Philostratus mentions far less about such wonders than about his cultic and philosophical activities. True, in Pergamum the sage is said to have healed many people (4.11), and in Rome he raises a dead bride to life (4.45), but he is not depicted primarily as a wandering healer. These are isolated incidents in the life of a preacher and cultic reformer. There are passing references to Apollonius' exorcisms (4.44), and an account of the exorcism of an Athenian youth (4.20). Yet these activities, too, are rare in Philostratus' narrative, especially when compared with other late antique hagiography (so Anderson 1986:138).

Moreover, the author shows a tendency to explain these powers as the more-or-less mechanical application of Apollonius' superior knowledge of the world. So when the sage subdues the hostile ghost of a Satyr in Ethiopia, this is not due to his own innate power but because he knows how to manipulate such spirits (6.27; cf. 4.25). In fact, miraculous performances are not limited to Apollonius in the narrative. In addition to the Brahmins who are akin to the sage himself, the leader of the Egyptian gymnosophists is able to command a tree to salute Apollonius. This miracle is only performed, however, as supporting evidence for their more important claim to be wise (6.10). The wise are thus depicted as having a superior understanding of the cosmos which allows them to manipulate it in ways which are impossible for those without such knowledge. These acts do not, however, define the profession of the naked sages any more than they are the focus of Apollonius' own travels.[8]

[8] See also 5.42 where Apollonius recognizes that a lion is inhabited by soul of King Amasis (5.42)

Much more emphasis is placed on the sage's foreknowledge, another product of his superior wisdom. Apollonius predicts a plague in Ephesus (4.4) and then averts it (4.10). In his Western travels the sage foretells that Nero will try to cut through the Isthmus but will not finish (5.7), and on his way back to Greece he predicts the sinking of a ship (5.18). In Alexandria Apollonius predicts the acquittal and escape of a condemned prisoner (5.24), and later forecasts that Vespasian will rebuild a temple which is being destroyed in Rome (5.30). Often this foreknowledge is based on his understanding of omens. On Crete he interprets an earthquake as sign that a new island is being born (4.34), and at Syracuse he recognizes a three-headed baby as a sign of the brief reigns of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius (5.13; cf. 5.11). Here again, however, Philostratus distances Apollonius from the figure of the professional prophet. When he interprets a portent at Rome (4.43), Apollonius explicitly denies that he is a prophet (μάντις), claiming instead that his foreknowledge comes through god-revealed wisdom (4.44). Thus, while the tendency among academics has been to view Apollonius as a wandering thaumaturge, the sage's miraculous activity does not define his profession in Philostratus' account. Such miracle-working certainly does not form the primary motive behind his itinerant lifestyle. Instead Apollonius is depicted as an itinerant cultic expert and philosopher, whose exalted wisdom allows him to perform the odd healing or exorcism along the way.

Travel as Heroic Feat

Not only do the travels of Apollonius help to establish his status as the supreme wise man, they also represent a feat with which the sage is ranked with the divine heroes of the mythic past. We must remember at this point that, even within the Roman empire, travel remained much more dangerous than it is today. Outside of those imperial boundaries, beyond the reach of Roman power to restrain bandits and build strong roads, travel was often regarded as a terrifying prospect. Hence Apollonius' journey east, among barbarous peoples, is a demonstration of his superior "courage" (ἀνδρεία) (Elsner 1997:30). When some of his followers balk at the plan they are left behind as "soft and effeminate" (μαλακῶς) (1.18). On the other hand, Philostratus emphasizes "the courage which Apollonius showed, in making a journey through races of barbarians and robbers" (1.20). The passage through these strange lands then becomes another opportunity for Apollonius to demonstrate both his virtue and power. The sage overcomes a threatening garrison at the border of Babylonia by the sheer force of his wisdom (1.21). The head of the garrison, who would normally be regarded as strong and brave, is terrified when he sees Apollonius "so dried up and parched" from his journey and starts "to bawl out like a cowardly woman." Apollonius, on the other hand, announces his intention to "see whether I can make men of you, whether you like it or not" (1.21). When the sage enters Babylon itself, he refuses to worship the Babylonian king's image, despite the threat of death for such insolence (1.27). Yet instead of being killed, Apollonius is led into the king's presence as an honoured guest (1.28). When asked if he will "flout" the king, he replies "Why, of course I will . . . if on making his acquaintance I find him to be neither honourable nor good" (1.28). Instead of taking offence, however, the king himself recognizes Apollonius as a "wise man" (1.29). Disregarding Damis' warnings against offending the monarch (1.33), Apollonius then refuses all of his offered gifts, asking only for justice for the Eritreans and some dried fruit and bread to eat (1.35). When the pair

finally reach the castle of the Brahmins, their Indian guide is terrified. Yet Apollonius remains undisturbed (3.10).

Along the way, Elsner observes how Philostratus sets up an "insistent parallelism" between this quest and the heroic journeys of Heracles, Dionysus and Alexander, all of whom were themselves regarded as gods or demi-gods. What is more, Apollonius is shown to be greater than Alexander himself, for he succeeds where the conqueror failed and brings back (intellectual) treasure from the depths of India (Elsner 1997:30; see, e.g., 2.9, 33, 43). Where even Heracles and Dionysus failed to penetrate the castle of the Brahmins by force, Apollonius gains entry because of his great wisdom (2.33). Indeed, Apollonius himself says in 3.16 that this journey east is one "never till now accomplished by any of the inhabitants of my country" (ἥκειν με ὁδόν, ἣν μήπω τις τῶν ὅθεν περ ἐγὼ ἀνθρώπων). These travels to the eastern edge of the world are thus portrayed by Philostratus as the kind of feat which a divinized hero might perform, and they serve to establish a connection between the sage and other figures who gained divine status.

Yet Apollonius' heroic courage and conquering wisdom do not disappear with his return from the East. When the sage leaves Alexandria for the Egyptian countryside, many of his company stay behind. Apollonius responds by comparing the departure with the moment when athletes leave training and enter the arena (5.43). They may have absorbed his teaching at a superficial level, but the prospect of arduous travel now puts their virtue and philosophical attainment to the test. Travel by sea is regarded as particularly hazardous (see, e.g., 7.13), but Apollonius' wisdom can overcome even these dangers. In fact, when the sage departs from Sicily for Greece many want to join him on the voyage, precisely because he has gained a reputation "as one who was master of the tempest and of fire and of perils of all sorts" (4.13). Sure enough, though the sea of Euboea is known in Homer as extremely dangerous, with Apollonius on board "the sea was smooth and was much better than you expected in that season" (4.15). The sage's travels are thus not only the source of his wisdom and the opportunity for its exercise. These journeys are also in themselves a challenge which demonstrates Apollonius' superior virtue and earn him a place alongside the mythic heroes of the past.

Travel as Political Conquest

These themes of travel as a demonstration of the sage's wisdom and travel as a courageous feat come together when the journeys of Apollonius take on a political significance. In many places the sage's teaching turns out to have political value, precisely because it includes advice about how to govern, how to relate to other citizens, etc. In many cases, his advice brings about a positive transformation in the life of the local people (see e.g., 1.23-24; 6.38, 41). In some cases, however, the challenge which Apollonius faces in entering a new locale is the local regime itself. In order to maintain his wise way of life, the sage must challenge or disobey the political powers. This is certainly the motive behind Apollonius' lack of deference toward the Babylonian king. Yet since Apollonius lives within the sphere of the Roman Empire, this theme of confrontation with foolish political powers is played out in the text primarily through a series of encounters with the various Emperors.

The sage's two visits to Rome mark the culmination of two phases in his itinerant travels. He first goes to the imperial city at the end of book four, as the crowning event of

his journeys through Ionia, Greece, and Crete (4.35). Outside the city, he meets Philolaus, who warns Apollonius that the Emperor Nero is persecuting the philosophers (4.36). At one level, this incident furnishes another example of the sage's courage. For while Philolaus convinces most of Apollonius' followers to flee, he does not dissuade the sage himself (Elsner 1997:33; 4.37). Instead Apollonius criticizes Philolaus as "too soft to bear any hardships" (4.36). The sage himself, on the other hand, has overcome fear, and as he moves on to Rome he likens his "bravery" (ἀνδρεία) to the courage with which he face the "wild beasts" in Arabia and India (4.38). Yet Rome represents more for Apollonius than just one more danger to be overcome. Once he learns of the ruler's attacks on philosophers, he goes forward determined to challenge this foolish and vice-ridden tyrant (4.38). He and his followers are portrayed as heroes going out to war for wisdom against her adversary (4.38). This first battle is won by the forces of wisdom, for neither the consul (4.40) nor the Praetorian Prefect (4.43-44) are able to hold or prosecute him. Tigellinus, the Prefect, is even converted to his philosophy and recognizes that Apollonius' wisdom is "inspired and above the wit of man" (4.44). As Elsner observes, however, the sage does not confront Nero himself, for the Emperor leaves for Greece before they can come face to face (1997:34). Moreover, the victory of wisdom in this first skirmish is not straightforward, for although Apollonius makes converts and stirs up a general religious revival in Rome, he leaves the city with a decree still in place forbidding the public teaching of philosophy (4.47).

Through Apollonius' journeys to the West and to Egypt this conflict between wisdom and Roman power simmers just beneath the surface. In Spain the sage seems to join with the governor of Baetica in conspiring to raise a war against Nero (5.10). In Alexandria, Vespasian seeks out Apollonius for his advice on government (5.27-37), and he wins from the Roman leader some concessions on behalf of the Egyptian people (5.28-9). Yet this all takes place before Vespasian has actually assumed the throne, and once in Rome the leader adopts oppressive policies toward Greece. Apollonius exercises his freedom to protest the Emperor's actions by refusing his invitations to visit Rome, but folly remains firmly in power (5.41). The sage is more successful in his contacts with Vespasian's successor, Titus. He takes the initiative to write to Titus, commending him on the conquest of Jerusalem, and Titus writes back overjoyed (6.29). The general invites him to visit his estate in Tarsus, where Apollonius advises him on statecraft (6.31), predicts the manner of his death (6.32), and once more gains favours for the city in which they are meeting (6.34). Here again, however, this positive contact takes place before Titus has assumed his role as Emperor, and Apollonius has still not set foot back in Rome (so Elsner 1997:34).

The direct confrontation between Apollonius and a ruling emperor must wait for the sage's second journey to the imperial capitol, the event which stands at the climax of Philostratus' biography and occupies nearly all of chapters seven and eight. This confrontation is, as Elsner writes, Apollonius' "supreme philosophical test" (1997:33). After his return from Egypt we are told that the sage continued his itinerant life, though he traveled less often and only to places he had already visited. The narrative is only picked up again when Apollonius hears of Domitian's cruelty and vice and begins a campaign of sustained opposition against the Emperor and his policies (7.5-9). Rather than wait to be arrested, the sage goes on his own initiative to Rome to confront the foolish leader on his own territory (7.10). On the way Apollonius meets his old friend

Demetrius the Cynic (7.11), who once again describes Domitian’s persecution of philosophers and urges the sage to flee the ruler’s wrath (7.12). This time even faithful Damis is ready to run away (7.13), but Apollonius rebukes him for his cowardice and affirms his own willingness to die for "freedom" (ἐλευθερία) (7.14). He is going voluntarily "to risk his life for men" (7.31; cf. 7.19; so Elsner 1997:34). Thus the sage’s final entry into Rome represents not only his indomitable courage, but also his conviction that as a philosopher he must oppose those powers which are hostile to wisdom.

This time the confrontation ends with a clear victory for wisdom. Apollonius’ initial hearings are indecisive. Aelian reacts favourably and does not support the Emperor's hostility (7.17-20), but the tribune simply mocks the sage (7.21). Nevertheless Apollonius is undaunted and compares his upcoming trial with Domitian to taming a lion (7.30). His Indian mentors knew how to calm those beasts, and their great wisdom will enable the sage to overcome this beastly ruler. Philostratus’ account of the trial before Domitian is extremely long and includes the transcript of a long prepared speech which Apollonius did not have the opportunity to deliver. The tone of the account is summed up well, however, when Philostratus says that the sage "seems to regard the trial as a dialectical discussion, rather than as a race to be run for his life" (8.2). In the end, not only is Apollonius acquitted by the Emperor (8.5), but he suddenly and miraculously disappears from the court (8.5, 8).

Hence Domitian is made "a plaything (παίγνιον) of [Apollonius’] philosophy" (8.10). As Elsner writes, this miracle is the sage’s "triumph over evil" (1997:34). He has demonstrated that wisdom can conquer the greatest of political forces when they stand in its way. As if to underline the freedom and supremacy of the sage, Philostratus then reports that Apollonius was translated miraculously from the Imperial court to Dicaearchia to meet Damis and Demetrius (8.10-12). Soon after, in Ephesus, Apollonius is given a miraculous vision of the Emperor’s murder, even while the event is happening in Rome (8.25-26). Geographic distance seems to have become irrelevant to the sage. Apollonius’ victory over Domitian represents his "sacred conquest over the empire as a whole" (Elsner 1997:34). Travel is thus no longer necessary to one whose wisdom holds sway over all the earth.

At the outset of the conflict with Domitian Philostratus writes that "the conduct of philosophers under despotism is the truest touchstone of their character" and indicative of "courage" (7.1). According to this standard, Apollonius’ deliberate journey to Rome and confrontation of Domitian constitutes a philosophical feat greater than any other (see 7.1-4). With this victory the sage’s war with Rome is at an end. As Elsner points out (1997:34), Apollonius refuses Nerva's invitation to visit the city, even though the sage has been an ardent supporter of that latter Emperor (8.27-28). The work in Rome is done, however, and Apollonius is now free to pursue his proper work of teaching and cultic reform.

Preliminary Conclusions: The Itinerant Apollonius

The travels of Apollonius thus play a key part in the depiction of the sage as supremely wise and courageous. His early travels in search of a teacher suggest the extent of his natural talents, and his journey East represents the source of his mature wisdom. His later itinerancy within the Mediterranean world demonstrates his unique wisdom,

both in cultic matters and in philosophy more generally. While his eastern journey brings about his transformation to a divine sage, these later wanderings demonstrate that he has nothing more to learn, for he has already mastered all there is to know (see, esp., 6.35; 7.7.3; Elsner 1997:31). At the same time, these travels are themselves a dangerous activity which demonstrate the sage's courage, while the extent of his penetration of the East constitutes a feat greater even than those of Heracles, Asclepius and Alexander. The sage's journeys to Rome mark the culmination of his philosophical life and represent his conquest, as the bearer of wisdom, over the political forces which would oppose philosophy. Hence by the end of his life this paragon of wisdom is worshipped openly at Olympia as a divine being (8.15), for the feats which these travels represent are more than human. Increasingly, the holy pilgrim becomes himself a site of pilgrimage as people recognize the truth underlined by his conquest of Rome: that the wisdom of the divine Apollonius is itself the centre and fulcrum of the cosmos.[9]

How much of this depiction reflects the activities of the "historical Apollonius"? This is a question which is not likely to be settled soon, although the global skepticism of Philostratus' account which was once common is less popular in current scholarship (see Anderson 1986:155-97). Apollonius' journey to India is perhaps the most dubious element of the sage's itinerary, particularly given the symbolic value which it carries for the author (see Anderson 1986:199-226; Elsner 1997:22-23). At the same time, someone like Apollonius might have embarked on such a trip precisely because of its symbolic value, and we do know that trade routes connected the Mediterranean world with the Indian sub-continent. It does look suspicious that Apollonius is depicted traveling not only to the extreme East, but also the extreme West (4.47-5.10) and South (5.43-6.28). This travel to all corners of the world does seem like rhetorical support for the claim that his wisdom is universal and all-encompassing (so Elsner 1997:31; cf. 1.21; 4.7). Still, there is no compelling reason to doubt that Apollonius actually traveled outside of Greece, Ionia, and Italy, and he may well have been conscious that this activity would be perceived as adding weight to his claims of wisdom.

We are on firmer ground when we examine the nature of his itinerant activity within the Greco-Roman heartland. Aside from the odd miracle story, nothing that Philostratus says about the sage's lifestyle is implausible. Aside from a brief period early on in Syria, Apollonius is depicted as an urban figure, moving from city to city. The narrative moves very quickly from one location to the next, but where Philostratus provides actual time references these suggest that the sage often spent several months or more in one location (see, e.g., 1.39; 3.50; 4.34; 5.18; 8.18, 24, 30). This would suggest a pace not unlike that of the Apostle Paul. Unlike Paul, there is no evidence to suggest that

[9] Philostratus tells us that, already during the sage's adolescence, the temple in Aegae became "a Lyceum and Academy" as men flocked to discuss philosophy with him (1.13; cf. 1.8, 9, 10). Back in Ionia, after his eastern journey, even the ordinary craftspeople "would not remain at their handicrafts, but followed him, one admiring his wisdom, another his beauty, another his way of life, another his bearing, some of them everything alike about him" (4.1). After his conversion to Apollonius' philosophy in Greece (4.25), Demetrius follows the sage to Rome (4.42). It is after Apollonius returns from his encounter with Domitian, however, that pilgrims begin to seek him out in large numbers. When people realize he has returned from Rome and is in Olympia, Philostratus says, "they all flocked to see him from the whole of Greece, and never did any such crowd flock to any Olympic festival as then" (8.15; cf. 8.21). As Elsner observes, even the gods eventually come down to meet him, reversing the usual pattern of pilgrimage altogether (1997:28; see 8.17, 19-20).

Apollonius founded communities of his followers. On the other hand, he does not seem to have been a lone wanderer either, for Philostratus makes repeated mention of an "association" (κοινόν) of between 5 and 35 followers who traveled with him (4.34, 37; 5.43). While it may seem implausible to suggest that such a sage would sleep habitually in temples, there is no reason to doubt either that Apollonius made a practice of pilgrimage to holy sites or that he cast himself as an expert in cultic matters. On the other hand, it is equally plausible to imagine that such a holy traveller understood himself primarily as a philosopher and delivered speeches on standard philosophical subjects.

This focus in Apollonius' travels on philosophical teaching is important to underline, since there has been some tendency to suggest that Philostratus has domesticated an essentially shamanistic figure and presented him in philosophical guise. Yet it would seem that Apollonius himself wrote a life of Pythagoras (see, e.g., *Iamb.*, *VP* 35.254), and so it is most reasonable to believe that he was actually a self-proclaimed Pythagorean who combined his philosophical pursuits with cultic interests in ways not unlike the neo-Pythagoreans of the third- and fourth-centuries CE. Moreover, the pattern of movement from one city to the next, with stops lasting between a few months and a few years, is reminiscent of reports of other Greco-Roman philosophers and sophists.[10] Was Apollonius more of a thaumaturge than Philostratus allows? This is possible. The biographer does seem to be fighting the idea that Apollonius was a magician, a γόης.[11] It is striking, however, that although Philostratus seems pleased when he can report miracle stories, he includes so few. So whether or not Apollonius believed he could heal, foretell the future, or cast out demons, it is likely that his primary profession was that of a wandering philosopher and cultic expert, not a wandering exorcist or miracle-worker.[12] Finally, given the influence of Reitzenstein it is important to notice here that Apollonius is not depicted as introducing foreign, eastern cults, but rather as reforming and strengthening the existing patterns of worship in each locale. Likewise, while he is initiated into the Epidaurian mystery, this is only later in his life, and Philostratus gives us no suggestion that his travels were motivated by the desire to initiate others into a such a mystery.[13] On the contrary, Philostratus' account would most plausibly reflect the legends which developed around an itinerant philosopher with a penchant for shrines and cultic matters.

II. Lives of Pythagoras: Porphyry and Iamblichus

---

[10] Even within Philostratus' work, note how Demetrius and Musonius are both depicted as moving between Rome and various Greek cities (5.19).

[11] Anderson 1986:138-39; see Lucian, *Alex.* 5; Origen, *CCels.* 6.41; Dio 78.18.4. Anderson points out that Apollonius explicitly denies being able to change shape, a power often associated with magic (6.34).

[12] Here again Anderson notes (1986:147) that "respectable public orators" like Aristides or Rufinus are also said to have performed the odd marvel, averting an earthquake, foretelling a plague, etc. Anderson points out the significant overlap between the interests and "questionable" activities of Apollonius and those of Dio of Prusa (1986:147-48). Unless Philostratus has significantly distorted the memory of Apollonius, Dio seems a better parallel than Anderson's other comparison, Bardesanes of Edessa (1986:148).

[13] The only emphasis on esoteric rites comes in 8.19 when Apollonius goes into the cave of Trophonius in Lebadea and emerges with a book of Pythagorean philosophy. We should also note that Damis is said to have credited Apollonius with having written four works on astrology, and Philostratus seems defensive about such a suggestion (3.41). Anderson points out, however, that educated intellectuals like Apuleius and Plutarch commonly dabbled in esoteric subjects (1986:146-47). This did not make them mystagogues.

In discussing Apollonius' itinerant lifestyle of sacred pilgrimage, Elsner suggests that Philostratus' audience "would surely have expected such activity from a holy man" (1997:26). But does the traveling lifestyle of Apollonius really represent a common paradigm in the late antique mind? Since Elsner (1997:26) points to the lives of Pythagoras by Porphyry and Iamblichus as evidence, it is appropriate to look first at those works for evidence of such a common pattern. Moreover, these lives of Pythagoras are also important because they depict Apollonius' own philosophical master (see, e.g., *VA* 1.2; 3.13, 19; 8.19).[14]

Travel and the Quest for Wisdom

As with Apollonius, the childhood travels of Pythagoras are part and parcel of his depiction as a precocious learner. In Porphyry it is because the philosopher has "a natural aptitude from childhood for all kinds of learning (ἐκ παίδων εἰς πᾶσαν μάθησιν ὄντος εὐφυοῦς)" that Mnesarch adopts him as a student and takes him first to Tyre (Porph., *VP* 1) and later to Italy (Porph., *VP* 2). In between these trips we are told that the brilliant pupil studied with Pherecydes in Syros, as well as with Hermodamas in his home-town of Samos (Porph., *VP* 1). Later Porphyry adds that the young Pythagoras was sent to a musician, a teacher, and a visual artist for training, before being sent to Miletus to study geometry with Anaximander (Porph., *VP* 11). Although the specifics are different in Iamblichus, the story is similar. Pythagoras is sent to study "over the sea" with Pherecydes and with Anaximander and Thales in Miletus (Iamb., *VP* 2.11-12). Both authors agree that Pythagoras was so precocious that he could only learn from the brightest minds of his day.

Pythagoras is then said to have traveled in the East, just as did Apollonius. Already during his childhood trip to Tyre Porphyry tells us that Mnesarch introduced Pythagoras to the Chaldeans that "le fit profiter d'eux au maximum" (Porph., *VP* 1). At the start of his adult career, however, he embarks on a long journey in search of wisdom which includes visits to Egypt, the Chaldeans, the Phoenecians, the Arabs, and the Persian Magi (Porph., *VP* 6, 11). Even the Hebrews are said to have taught him knowledge of dreams (τὴν περὶ ὀνείρων γνῶσιν) (Porph., *VP* 11). Porphyry emphasizes that each of these peoples enjoys a recognized expertise in some field of wisdom: Egyptians in geometry, Chaldeans in numbers and calculation, the Phoenicians in astronomy (Porph., *VP* 6).[15] From the Egyptian priests Pythagoras also learns three kinds of writing (ἐπιστολογραφικῶν τε καὶ ἱερογλυφικῶν καὶ συμβολικῶν) which serve as the root of his allegorical style of teaching, as well as "something more" (πλέον τι) about the gods (Porph., *VP* 12). From the Chaldeans, and especially Zoroaster, Pythagoras receives purification from the impurities of his former life (ἐκαθάρη τὰ τοῦ προτέρου βίου

[14] For a discussion of the divinity of Pythagoras in Porphyry and Iamblichus, see Edwards 1993. In Iamblichus see passages such as *VP* 3.15-17; 6.30; 19.92; 28.135. In Porphyry see, e.g., *VP* 20.

References to the Iamblichus' work *On the Pythagorean Way of Life* are taken from Dillon and Hershbell 1991. The Greek text used here for Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* is that of des Places 1982. The English quotations of Porphyry's work are my own translation.

[15] We are also told that Pythagoras learned about rituals for the gods (τὰς τῶν θεῶν ἁγιστείας) and precepts governing daily life (τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιτηδευμάτων) from the Magi (6), though these men are not explicitly said to be experts.

λύματα) and learns how to maintain this purity (οὗ ἁγνεύειν). Zoroaster also passes on to Pythagoras the theory of nature (τόν τε περὶ φύσεως λόγον) and the principles of the universe (τίνες αἱ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχαί) (Porph., *VP* 12). Hence Pythagoras is depicted as collecting in his own person the wisdom of all the world's wisest races, none of whom on its own can compare to his own breadth or scope. As Porphyry writes: "It was from wandering around these nations that Pythagoras traded in (or accumulated) the best wisdom (Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς περὶ ταῦτα τὰ ἔθνη πλάνης ὁ Πυθαγόρας τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς σοφίας ἐνεπορεύσατο)" (Porph., *VP* 12).

Although the itinerary is different in Iamblichus' account, the overall point of this voyage is the same. Sailing first to Sidon (Iamb., *VP* 3.13), Pythagoras joins "the descendants of Mochus" as a "prophet and natural philosopher", while also spending time with "other Phoenician hierophants" (Iamb., *VP* 3.14). In their company the philosopher is initiated into "all sacred rites of the mysteries celebrated especially in Byblos and in Tyre, and in many parts of Syria" (Iamb., *VP* 3.14). From Sidon he proceeds by ship to Egypt, having realized that the Egyptian rites are older, "more noble, more divine and pure" (Iamb., *VP* 3.14). There he remains for a total of 22 years, visiting each holy site, studying astronomy and geometry, and being initiated into "all the mystic rites of the gods" (Iamb., *VP* 4.18-19). As Iamblichus tells it, Pythagoras is then carried to Babylon as a prisoner by the troops of king Cambyses (Iamb., *VP* 4.19). He is soon freed, however, and spends a "mutually gratifying" time with the Magi, learning the "perfect worship of the gods" and reaching "the highest point in knowledge of numbers, music, and other mathematical sciences" (Iamb., *VP* 4.19). Only after twelve years does he return to Greece (Iamb., *VP* 4.19), and it is in large part because of this journey that Iamblichus says that the philosopher's wisdom was gained "from the barbarians" (Iamb., *VP* 5.21; cf. 29.158-59).

Thus both Porphyry and Iamblichus depict Pythagoras as embarking early in life on a tour of the East in which he gains the wisdom which he will later share with the Greek world. The precise geography and chronology of this trip are not the same as those of Apollonius' eastern journey. Both Porphyry and Iamblichus agree, also, in setting the Egyptian tour of Pythagoras within this early eastern trip, rather than at a separate, later date.[16] Finally, Iamblichus departs from Porphyry in his insistence that Pythagoras continued to learn after his return from the East, even from some sages within the Greek world (Iamb., *VP* 5.25, 27; 28.151). Yet the general structure is highly reminiscent of the life of Apollonius.

Activities in Greece and Italy

There are also similarities between the later life of Pythagoras in these two accounts and the later Mediterranean journeys of Apollonius. Pythagoras, too, has a

[16] There does seem to be a thematic similarity, however, between Pythagoras' Egyptian experience in Porphyry's version and Apollonius' time in that same region. Porphyry depicts the Egyptian priests as resistant to Pythagoras, drumming up pretenses on which to pass him on from one temple to the next (*VP* 7). Moreover, as with Apollonius, Pythagoras' visit to Egypt is used by Porphyry to display his superior wisdom and "endurance" (καρτερίαν). When the priests of Diospolis try to scare the philosopher away with "the intensity of the suffering" which they demand, Pythagoras is simply convinced that the Diospolitan cult and priesthood were better than any other (*VP* 8).

fascination with shrines and sanctuaries, not only in the East (Porph., *VP* 7; Iamb., *VP* 4.18; 5.25), but also in Greece. And in at least some cases he is depicted as contributing constructively to these cults (e.g., Porph., *VP* 16, 17; Iamb., *VP* 5.25). Both Porphyry and Iamblichus tell us that much of Pythagoras' time was spent teaching philosophy, often in public speeches (e.g., Porph., *VP* 18-19; Iamb., *VP* 7.34; 8.35-11.57). Both also report that the philosopher continued to travel both in Greece and in Italy, and both locate his activities for the most part in cities or in their associated cult centres. Iamblichus even ascribes to Pythagoras the same kind of influence over the dangers of the sea which Apollonius seems to exercise (Iamb., *VP* 3.16), and extols the philosopher's courage (ἀνδρείας) in traveling alone through uncivilized lands (Iamb. *VP* 32.214). Moreover, the potential conflict between philosophy and political powers are also emphasized by both Iamblichus and Porphyry. Pythagoras is said to go into exile from Samos because the tyranny of Polycrates has become "too extreme" (συντονωτέραν) for a "free man" (ἐλευθέρῳ ἀνδρὶ) to tolerate (Porph., *VP* 9, 16; cf. Iamb., *VP* 2.11).[17] It is another political conflict, this time with Cylon of Croton, which marks the end of the philosopher's public career. Enraged that Pythagoras will not accept him for teaching, the tyrant burns down the house where the Pythagoreans are gathered (Porph., *VP* 54-56; *Iamb.*, *VP* 35.248-53). There is no vindication for the philosopher, no victory like that of Apollonius over Domitian, and Pythagoras is said to end his days facing the closed gates of hostile cities, as a refugee in the sanctuary of the Muses at Metapont, or in grief-stricken suicide (Porph., *VP* 56-7; Iamb., *VP* 35.249; though see 35.261-64). Still, this story, like the story of Apollonius, comes to its climax with a great confrontation between wisdom and the temporal ruler.

At the same time, there are also striking differences between the itinerant life of Apollonius and the later activities of Pythagoras. To begin with, although Pythagoras continues to travel he is not depicted as itinerant in any proper sense. In both Porphyry and Iamblichus he returns home to Samos after his time in the East and attempts to teach his old neighbours, only to find them unreceptive (Porph., *VP* 9; Iamb., *VP* 5.20-24). His subsequent travels in Greece are thus not a deliberately chosen lifestyle, but a reaction to the bad situation on Samos. Porphyry has Pythagoras leave once for his tour of Greece, return, and depart again for Italy in order to escape the pressure of a tyrannical government. Iamblichus is more vague about the philosopher's reasons for going to Italy, saying simply that the laws and public duties required of him at Samos were onerous, and that Pythagoras realized after some time that all great philosophers must work in exile (Iamb., *VP* 6.28). Whatever the precise reasons for his departure for Italy, however, the philosopher still does not become itinerant at this point. Rather he moves to Italy and settles in Croton, apparently making periodic trips from there to other Italian cities, but always returning to his adopted home. There is no hint that Pythagoras makes any trips to distant lands like Spain or Ethiopia.

Nor is the comparatively sedentary life of Pythagoras the only difference between his pattern of travel and that of Apollonius. While Apollonius sometimes brings peace or prosperity to cities like Alexandria or Tarsus, there is a great deal more emphasis placed on deliberate political activities in the accounts of Pythagoras' years in Italy: freeing cities enslaved by tyrants or foreign powers (Porph., *VP* 21; Iamb., *VP* 7.33; 32.220-222),

---

[17] Though the two texts disagree widely about the age at which this took place. In Iamblichus the philosopher is 18, while in Porphyry he is 41.

writing legal codes (Porph., *VP* 21; Iamb., *VP* 7.33-34; 9.45-50), and subduing internal conflict (Porph., *VP* 22). Although Pythagoras does spend much of his time in a cave when he is at home on Samos (Iamb., *VP* 5.27), there is no mention of his sleeping in temples as does Apollonius. Also in sharp contrast to Apollonius is the fact that Pythagoras founds communities, first a school on Samos (Iamb., *VP* 5.26) and then the group termed *Magna Graeca* (Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα) at Croton whose members hold their property in common and follow his teachings "as if divine admonishments" (ὡσανεὶ θείας ὑποθήκας) (Porph., *VP* 20; Iamb., *VP* 6.30).

A more subtle, if no less significant, difference between the journeys of Apollonius and those of Pythagoras is the degree of emphasis which is placed on the traveler's miraculous acts. Where Apollonius appears as a philosopher who occasionally happens to perform a miracle, Pythagoras appears much more consistently as a thaumaturge. Porphyry tells us that the philosopher often predicted earthquakes, cleansed cities of plagues, stopped violent winds or hail storms, and even calmed the waves on rivers and seas in order for his disciples to cross easily (Porph., *VP* 29). Once, when crossing the river Caucasus (or Nessus?), he is said to have greeted the waters and heard a loud response: "Greetings, Pythagoras!" (Porph., *VP* 27; Iamb., *VP* 28.134). On another occasion he appears publicly in Metapont in Italy and in Tauromenium in Sicily on the same day (Porph., *VP* 27; Iamb., *VP* 28.134). Similarly, Iamblichus describes how a group of sailors see him on Mt. Carmel, walking leisurely while at the same time overcoming chasms and sheer rocks (Iamb., *VP* 3.15-16). And, of course, one must not forget the story of the golden arrow presented to Pythagoras by Abaris the Hyperborean, with which the philosopher was able to fly through the air (Iamb., *VP* 19.91-92). Hence both Porphyry and Iamblichus group Pythagoras together with the wonder-workers Empedocles, Epimenides, and Abaris (Porph., *VP* 29; cf. Iamb., *VP* 28.135-36). Iamblichus even exclaims that "ten thousand other incidents more divine and wonderful than these are related regularly and consistently about the man" (Iamb., *VP* 28.135). Admittedly, the difference here is one of degree. Yet the miraculous activities of Pythagoras seem to dominate his image, even in an elite biography, to an extent that Apollonius' wonders do not.[18]

Finally, both Porphyry and Iamblichus associate Pythagoras closely with the mysteries and with esotericism in a way that is foreign to Philostratus' account of Apollonius. Porphyry describes at length the elaborate initiations which Pythagoras underwent on Crete, rituals which involved (among other things) three courses of nine days incubation in the cave of Ida. These rites are supervised by the "initiates of Morgos" (τοῖς Μόργου μύσταις), who was himself one of the "Dactyles of Ida" (τῶν Ἰδαίων Δακτύλων), a group of mythical wizards who were associated with the cult of Rhea Cybele (Porph., *VP* 17). Iamblichus does not describe specific rites, but he does emphasize the philosopher's complete knowledge of mystic initiations, learned in part from "Orphics" and from "the mystic rites in Eleusis, Imbros, Samothrace, and Lemnos," along with other more vague "mystic associations" (Iamb., *VP* 28.151). In keeping with this emphasis on the mysteries and initiation, both Porphyry and Iamblichus describe how Pythagoras encoded his teachings in symbols, explaining its hidden meanings only to his inner circle of followers (see, e.g., Iamb., *VP* 23.103-105; 24.107-109; 35.254). True, in

[18] This is especially telling since at least Porphyry betrays some distaste for the more lurid of Pythagoras' supposed miracles. See Porph, *VP* 28.

the eastern journey of Apollonius we find Damis excluded from teachings which are appropriate only to the few, but this access is never associated with special initiations. Moreover, when Apollonius returns to the Greco-Roman world any hint of such esotericism disappears and his teaching is offered openly to all.

Intermediate Conclusions: Pythagoras as Exiled Mystagogue

The comparison of Apollonius' travels with the movements of Pythagoras thus yields a complex mixture of similarity and difference. Both figures must travel in search of competent teachers early in life, and both gain (at least much of) their wisdom on an early journey to the legendary East. Both return to take up a life of philosophical teaching which includes activity in Greece, Crete, and Italy, and both maintain a lively interest in cultic sites. Both find that their philosophical activity leads them into confrontation with the political powers, and find themselves moving because of those conflicts. It is difficult to say precisely how we should understand these similarities. Are the second and third century CE lives of Pythagoras influenced by the image of Apollonius? Was Philostratus influenced by the earlier legends surrounding Pythagoras when he composed his account of Apollonius (so Miller 1907; Meyer 1917:383; contra Speyer 1974)? After all, it is generally agreed that the material in Porphyry and Iamblichus goes back to much older sources (see Burkert 1972:104f., n.37). Or could Apollonius himself have been influenced by those stories about Pythagoras, tales he likely included in his own biography of the ancient philosopher, and attempted to live out the pattern laid down by his philosophical hero (so Anderson 1986:136)?

Perhaps more important than the similarities between these two figures, however, are their differences. Where Apollonius is deliberately itinerant, Pythagoras favours a more sedentary existence, leaving his home in one city only after many years and (most often) only when he is compelled to. Where Apollonius gathers a small band of followers to travel with him, Pythagoras founds large and static communities. In response to political pressure, Apollonius moves to confront the Emperor, while Pythagoras flees into exile. In his teaching Apollonius focuses on public cultic renewal, while Pythagoras promulgates private mysteries. The comparison has revealed the opposite of what Elsner's suggested. The activities of Apollonius now appear, not as the expected movements of a divine man, but rather as a unique and specific pattern of behaviour. Moreover, it is the static figure in this pair who turns out to resemble most closely the wonder-working mystagogue of Reitzenstein's imagination. The itinerant figure, on the other hand, pursues a very different agenda of public teaching and worship. It would take a modern-day miracle to find in these diverse figures a single model of the divine traveler, whether we call him a θεῖος ἄνηρ or a "holy man," even though Apollonius and Pythagoras belong to the same tradition of thought.

III. Further Comparisons: Divinized Charlatans in Lucian of Samosata

This apparent diversity in the patterns of travel embraced by divinized human beings could, of course, be a product of poorly chosen examples. Perhaps Apollonius or Pythagoras is simply an atypical instance of a viable type. A brief glance at two other common examples of divinized humans will only increase the impression that such

figures adopted and were portrayed as adopting widely varying patterns of travel. For this purpose I have selected two of the popular figures who were ridiculed by the satirist Lucian, but who became for their followers the objects of cultic devotion.[19]

Alexander the "False Prophet"

Alexander was the founder and priest of a popular oracle shrine in his home town of Abonuteichos, on the southern shore of the Black Sea (9-10). Lucian derides him as an obvious charlatan, but we should notice that Lucian's own religious views are shaped by an Epicurean skepticism which was not shared by many of his contemporaries. He also ridicules Apollonius of Tyana himself (*Alex*. 5) and even the revered oracle shrines of Delphi, Delos, etc. (*Alex*. 8). We must thus take the satirist's description of Alexander's early life with a significant grain of salt. The report that Alexander was the student of a quack magician (*Alex.* 5) is often taken straightforwardly as evidence that the future oracular priest began as a practitioner of popular magic. We must remember, however, that accusations of magic were a stock method by which rhetors like Lucian would pillory their opponents. Still, it is worth noting that Lucian does not say the magician was itinerant. If the account is accurate, he may well have been a local healer with a strictly local trade. After death of his mentor, however, Lucian tells us that Alexander partnered with a Byzantine song-writer to practice this same "quackery and sorcery" for himself. They traveled around Asia minor, he says, "'trimming the fatheads'—for so they style the public in the traditional patter of magicians" (*Alex*. 6). At this stage, if Lucian's account is to be taken at face value, the pair have adopted a recognized profession as itinerant peddlers of charms and spells. Yet it is often overlooked that none of this activity gains them a reputation as divine.

The suggestion that Alexander might possess some super-human status arises only later, and as a result of his role in the oracle shrine which he and his friend found in Abonuteichos. Yet in this role Alexander does not travel at all. Instead, he remains stationary at his shrine, while people flood to visit him, first from Bithynia, Galatia, and Thrace (*Alex.* 18), and later from Ionia, Cilicia, Paphlagonia, and even Italy (*Alex*. 30).

---

[19] For allusions to the supposed divinity of Alexander, see Lucian, *Alex.* 3, 4, 9, 10-11, 15. Lucian tells us that he was supposed to have a golden thigh (see Iamb., *VP* 19.92; 28.135) and gave an oracle implying that he was a manifestation of Pythagoras' soul which would return again to Zeus (*Alex.* 40). Alexander is said to have asked the emperor to have coins minted in Abonuteichus with an image of the serpent Glycon on one side and Alexander's own on the other, "wearing the fillets of his grandfather Asclepius and holding the falchion of his maternal ancestor Perseus" (*Alex.* 58).

The divine status of Peregrinus is still more explicit. The philosopher calls himself "Proteus" after the sea-god in Homer (*Peregr.* 1), a son of Zeus (*Peregr.* 28). One follower praises him as "more conspicuous than the sun" and "able to rival Olympian Zeus himself" (*Peregr*. 4; cf. 6). Another implies that Peregrinus shares the same status as Heracles, Asclepius and Dionysus by saying that the same violent death they faced is appropriate for his master as well (*Peregr*. 4). Indeed, the association with Heracles recurs throughout Lucian's account, and it may well have been intended by Peregrinus himself when he decided on self-immolation (*Peregr*. 21, 24, 33, 36). Shortly before his suicide, Peregrinus then begins citing oracles to the effect that he will become "a guardian spirit of the night (δαίμονα νυκτοφύλακα)" (*Peregr*. 27; cf. 29-30). One critic jibes that "he already covets altars and expects to be imaged in gold" (*Peregr*. 27), while another speculates that some "dolts" will claim to have been healed by him, and that his disciples will erect an "oracular shrine" at the site of his death with its own priesthood and mystery (*Peregr*. 28; cf. 40-41). Lucian also reflects the belief in some quarters that Peregrinus had communicated with his followers from beyond the grave (*Peregr.* 41).

When he wants (on Lucian's cynical evaluation) to stir up business, Alexander does not travel about himself, but sends out prophets around the empire, warning cities of coming disasters and that they should come to the oracle for aid (*Alex.* 36). Nor is it clear that these prophets are itinerant, rather than being sent as messengers to specific cities. Likewise, while Alexander does establish mysteries in Abonuteichos to be observed by pilgrims to his shrine, the prophet does not travel about flogging his new rites. Rather, he offers them to those who come to the oracle (*Alex.* 38-9). Thus, far from reinforcing some common pattern of travel among divine men, Alexander seems to strengthen the impression that such a super-human status could be awarded to people engaged in widely differing activities.

Peregrinus Proteus

Peregrinus, another target of Lucian's bile, does travel extensively, and here we find more points of contact with the activities of Apollonius and Pythagoras. Yet even here we fail to find a close correspondence with any other figure's pattern of travel. Lucian refers in vague terms to the philosopher's early, scurrilous activities in Armenia and Asia (*Peregr.* 9). Yet he seems to have lived a basically static life. For after he strangled his aged father Lucian tells us he waited for some time to see how people would react before going into voluntary exile to escape punishment (*Peregr.* 10). Peregrinus is then said to have moved to Palestine where he associated with the "priests and scribes" of the Christians. Here again, however, his travel seems to have been a matter of moving from one fixed home to another. For Lucian says he became a local leader among the Christians, interpreting books, composing more, and being revered "as a god" second only to Christ (*Peregr.* 11). Still, Peregrinus remained attached to his home town, for after a brief imprisonment for his Christian activities he returned to see how he was faring in public opinion. It is only when he discovers that his former neighbours want him punished that Peregrinus adopts the guise of a Cynic philosopher, relinquishes his possessions, and departs again (*Peregr.* 14-15). Again he lived on the support of the Christian community until some unspecified "offence" forces him to leave (*Peregr.* 16). He then returns home for a third and final time and makes a futile bid to recover his possessions (*Peregr.* 16). As with Alexander, we should not accept this hostile account uncritically. As Lucian recounts them, however, Peregrinus' movements do not reflect an itinerant lifestyle. Rather, he appears as a man who would like to live a stable life in an established city, but whose corrupt behaviour makes such a settled existence impossible.

At this point Lucian tells us that Peregrinus went to Egypt to study asceticism and Cynic shamelessness with Agathobulus (*Peregr.* 17), and he seems to have adopted a more transient lifestyle as a proper Cynic philosopher. After training in Egypt, Peregrinus sailed to Italy (*Peregr.* 18) and from there on to Greece (*Peregr.* 19), delivering harsh philosophical speeches wherever he went. Even as a Cynic, however, Peregrinus may have led a more stable life than one might think at first glance. For Lucian says that the philosopher left Italy only when he was sent away *by the prefect of Rome* (*Peregr.* 18). This would seem to suggest that Peregrinus was based in the Imperial city throughout his time in that region. Likewise, there is some indication that his activities in Greece revolved around a home base in Elea (*Peregr.* 19). In any case, the Cynic philosopher (having how adopted the name Proteus) does not make his name by visiting all the cities

of Greece. Rather, he comes to the Olympic games, where all Greece has gathered, and criticizes them there for their "effeminate" ways (*Peregr.* 19). Lucian may misrepresent the general opinion when he claims that Peregrinus humiliated himself on that occasion. It is nevertheless telling that the philosopher chooses, in Lucian's account, to redeem himself with a spectacle at the next Olympiad (*Peregr.* 19-20). Moreover, instead of informing the Greek cities of his plans in person, he seems to have relied on word of mouth to spread the report that he would burn himself in Olympia (*Peregr.* 20-21). All of this reinforces the impression that Peregrinus is not highly mobile, and so relies on gatherings like the Olympic games to make contact with a cross-section of the Greek populace.

Several observations arise from this final example of a divinized human being in late antique literature. First, the activities of Peregrinus bear some significant resemblance to those of Apollonius and Pythagoras. Like both, he is a philosopher who spends much of his time delivering public speeches. He is active both in Greece and in Rome, and (like Pythagoras) he travels to Egypt in search of a philosophical teacher. Like Apollonius, Peregrinus comes into conflict with the political authorities in Rome, though instead of emerging victorious he is banished from the city and never returns. Nevertheless, Lucian's denial that this conflict is a sign of sincerity implies that at least some of Peregrinus' hearers saw in this confrontation the same kind of philosophical courage which Apollonius embodied for Philostratus (*Peregr.* 4; cf. 18). Finally, there is some suggestion that the philosopher associated his self-immolation with the virtuous asceticism of the Brahmans (*Peregr.* 25), the same group which is said to have taught Apollonius. Moreover, while Peregrinus does not journey as far as Babylon or India, he does begin his philosophical life with a period of training in the (relatively exotic) land of Egypt. Yet, once again, we are forced to recognize the differences between Peregrinus' pattern of activity and those of the other figures we have examined. Unlike Apollonius, Pythagoras, and Alexander, this philosopher shows no interest at all in visiting cultic sites. We have no evidence that he was ever regarded as a worker of miracles. His pattern of geographic stability, punctuated by forced relocations, is reminiscent of Pythagoras' later life, but it departs significantly both from the itinerancy of Apollonius and the fixed settledness of Alexander.

Conclusion: The Amazing Disappearing Shaman

What are we to conclude from these comparisons? Let us return to the three questions with which I began. First, it appears that there is very little in the way of a common pattern of actual travel among divinized human beings in late antiquity, either in their depictions or (most likely) in their actual practice. One of our examples is itinerant, two make periodic moves from one city to the next, and one remains stable and allows others to seek him out. Apollonius and Pythagoras both make long journeys east, but this feature of their lives may be a product of their arising from the same philosophical and biographical tradition. Only Apollonius travels widely in Mediterranean lands outside Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy. This is not so say that there are no similarities at all between the movements of some of these figures. It is interesting that three of the four visit Egypt, and that these same three also end up visiting Ionia, Greece, and Italy. Yet this same list of countries was visited, in one way or another, by many of the educated

and powerful in the late antique world. It does little to distinguish divinized humans from others. We might also notice that all four of our divinized figures travel primarily from city to city, spending relatively little time in outlying villages or in the countryside. Here again, however, this urban bias simply tells us that these divinized humans were (more-or-less) educated members of the urban classes.

Do we discover anything more when we ask about the *reasons why* these figures traveled, about their professions and activities? Here we do discover that all three of the figures who travel are depicted primarily as philosophers who deliver public speeches. This is particularly intriguing because the three figures *do not* all participate in other activities which are often associated with the travels of “divine men” or “holy men.” Only one, Pythagoras, even approaches the role of professional thaumaturge, while Peregrinus performs no miracles at all. Likewise, although Apollonius and Pythagoras make frequent pilgrimages to cultic sites, Peregrinus shows no particular interest in such ritual matters. Only Pythagoras could be said to focus on mysteries and their initiations, and it is only he who restricts his core teaching to an inner circle of followers. Again, only Pythagoras makes any attempt to found a community on the basis of his teachings. This evidence does not support the idea that all divinized figures shared a common, itinerant profession, but it does suggest that when such figures traveled (whether in representation or in reality) it was very often in the role of philosopher.

We can also see several ways in which travel seems often to contribute to the depiction of these figures as worthy of divine honours. If a figure had traveled as a child to study with distant teachers this seems to have reinforced the sense that he was endowed from birth with special abilities (so Bieler 1935-36:1.38). Journeys to the East or to Egypt are clearly associated with the attainment of wisdom and can lend a philosopher or cultic expert added authority. Travel to distant lands in general seems to have been regarded as a great feat which could sometimes be compared with the mythical voyages of Heracles, Dionysus and other demi-gods. It would also raise the profile of any philosopher if his travels had brought him into conflict with the established authorities of Rome, whether he displayed courage by moving toward the hostile centres of power or showed integrity by accepting exile for the sake of wisdom. There may not have been a single profession or sociological type whose travel was part and parcel of a divine identity. Still, this diversity does not prevent the writers of late antiquity, and perhaps even some of their subjects, from capitalizing in similar ways on the symbolic value of travel as part of a broader attempt to depict a human being as divine.

Bibliography

Anderson, Graham
1986 *Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the Third Century AD*. London: Croom Helm.

1993 *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire*. London and New York: Routledge.

1994 *Sage, Saint and Sophist: Holy Men and Their Associates in the Early Roman Empire*. London and New York: Routledge.

Bieler, Ludwig
1935-36. *ΘΕΙΟΣ ΑΝΗΡ: Das Bild des "göttlichen Menschen" in Spätantike und Frühchristentum*. 2 Volumes. Wien: Buchhandlung Oskar Höfels.

Bowie
1978 "Apollonius of Tyana, Tradition and Reality." *ANRW* II.xvi.2. Pp. 1652-99.

Brown, Peter
1982 "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity." In: *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp. 103-152.

Burkert, W.
1972 *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*. Trans. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Conybeare, F. C., ed.
1912 *Philostratus*. 2 Volumes. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Dillon, John and Jackson Hershbell, eds.
1991 *Iamblichus: On The Pythagorean Way of Life: Text, Translation, and Notes*. Texts and Translations, 29. Graeco-Roman Religion Series, 11. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Dzielska, Maria
1986 *Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History*. Trans. Piotr Pienkowski. Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider.

Edwards, Mark J.
1993 "Two Images of Pythagoras: Iamblichus and Porphyry." In H. J. Blumenthal and E. G. Clark, ed.: *The Divine Iamblichus:*

Philosopher and Man of Gods. London: Bristol Classical Press, pp. 159-172.

Elsner, John
1997 "Hagiographic Geography: Travel and Allegory in *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana*." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 117:22-37.

Harmon, A. M., trans.
1913-1967 *Lucian*. 8 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass./London, UK: Harvard University Press/Heinemann.

Kolenkow, A. B.
1994 "Paul and His Opponents in 2 Cor 10-13: THEIOI ANDRES and Spiritual Guides." In L. Bormann et al, ed.: *Religious Propaganda and Missionary Competition in the New Testament World*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, pp. 351-74.

Koskenniemi, Erkki
1994 *Apollonios von Tyana in der neutestamentlichen Exegese*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 2. Reihe, 61. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

1991 *Der Philostrateische Apollonios*. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.

Meyer, Eduard
1917 "Apollonius von Tyana und die Biographie des Philostratos." *Hermes* 52:371-424. = *Kleine Schriften*. 2 Volumes. Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1924. Pp. 131-91.

Miller, J.
1892 "Die Beziehungen der *Vita Apolonii* des Philostratos zur Pythagorassage." *Philologus* 51:137-45.

1907 "Die Damispapiere in Philostratos' Apolloniusbiographie." *Philologus* 66:511-25.

Miller, Patricia Cox
1983 *Biography in Late Antiquity: A Quest for the Holy Man*. Transformation of the Classical Heritage, 5. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Nickle, Keith F.
2001 *The Synoptic Gospels: An Introduction*. Revised. Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press.

Places, Édouard des, ed.
1982 *Porphyre: Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella*. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres."

Reitzenstein, Richard
1978 *The Hellenistic Mystery Religions: Their Basic Ideas and Significance*. Trans. John E. Steely. Pittsburgh Theological Monographs 15. Pittsburgh, PA: Pickwick Press. (first published as *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen*. Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 1910)

Rohde, Erwin
1871-1872 "Die Quellen des Iamblichus in seiner Biographie des Pythagoras." *RhM* 26:554-76, 27:23-61. = *Kleine Schriften*. 2 vols. Tübingen and Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1901. Pp. 102ff.

Speyer, W.
1974 "Zum Bild des Apollonius von Tyana bei Heiden und Christen." *JAC* 17:47-63.

Weeden, T. J.
1968 "The Heresy that Necessitated Mark's Gospel." *ZNW* 59:145-58.